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MISSION AND SCOPE: The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center 
(IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Food and Resource Economics Department 
(FRED) of the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of 
Florida. Its mission is to provide information, education, and research directed to 
immediate and long-term enhancement and sustainability of international trade and 
natural resource use. Its scope includes not only trade and related policy issues, but also 
agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, food, state, national and international 




 The Center’s objectives are to: 
 
•  Serve as a university-wide focal point and resource base for research on 
international agricultural trade and trade policy issues 
•  Facilitate dissemination of agricultural trade related research results and 
publications 
•  Encourage interaction between researchers, business and industry groups, 
state and federal agencies, and policymakers in the examination and 
discussion of agricultural trade policy questions 
•  Provide support to initiatives that enable a better understanding of trade and 
policy issues that impact the competitiveness of Florida and southeastern 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000 allows producers, 
who successfully petition the U.S. government to impose anti-dumping or countervailing 
tariffs on competing imports, to keep the proceeds of those tariffs.  In Louisiana, 
hundreds of crayfish farmers and processors are vying for a portion of over seven million 
dollars in duties on Chinese imports.  U.S. candle makers are also fighting over $65 
million collected from Chinese candle companies who pay 54% tariffs to get their 
products into the U.S (King).  One candle company, Candle-lite, received $38 million in 
fiscal year 2002 while one ball bearings company, Torrington, received $ 37 million in 
2002 (U.S. Customs Service).  This amendment also has implications for steel, rubber, 
pencil, pineapple, and pasta markets (King).  In fiscal year 2002, the U.S. government 
wrote checks totaling nearly $320 million to companies that could prove that they were 
involved in any anti-dumping or countervailing case that eventually led to imposed tariffs 
(U.S. Custom Service). 
 
The so-called “Byrd Amendment” effectively allows U.S. producers and processors to 
collect the resulting import tariff revenue that would otherwise accrue to the U.S. 
government.  Furthermore, even though CDSOA was passed in 2000, there is a 
grandfather clause that allows these groups to collect the tariff revenue from certain anti-
dumping and countervailing (ADCV) duties that were implemented prior to the 2000 Act.  
The CDSOA has serious present and future welfare implications in terms of transfers in 
Ricardian Rent among consumers, producers, and taxpayers.  It also provides an even 
greater incentive for a proliferation of future anti-dumping lawsuits. 
 
We begin by providing a general discussion of CDSOA and provide empirical evidence 
regarding ADCV tariffs placed on specific products.  We then draw upon partial 
equilibrium trade theory in order to develop an “optimal anti-dumping tariff” that 
maximizes the sum of producer surplus and tariff revenue.  This optimal anti-dumping   4
tariff represents the first-best situation for producers that successfully lobby for ADCV 
tariffs against competing products from other countries under the Byrd amendment.  The 
optimal anti-dumping tariff is compared to the optimal revenue tariff (the one that 
maximizes tariff revenue only) and the optimal welfare tariff (the one that maximizes the 
sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tariff revenue).
i  Tariff revenue and 
producer surplus associated with the optimal anti-dumping tariff are discussed and 
compared to those under the optimal revenue and optimal welfare tariffs.  Finally, 
conclusions are drawn. 
THE BYRD AMENDMENT 
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, known as the CDSOA or 
“Byrd Amendment,” was enacted on October 28, 2000 as Title X of the Agriculture, 
Rural Development, Food and Drug Appropriations Act, 2001 (“Act”), Public Law 106-
387 (U.S. Department of Treasury).
ii  The CDSOA modifies Title VII of the Tariff Act of 
1930 by instructing Customs to put all collected anti-dumping and countervailing tariffs 
into special accounts, one for each case, and to pay out these collected revenues directly 
to companies successfully participating in each case (U.S. Department of Treasury).   
Previously, the collected tariff revenues accrued to the general Treasury (eBearing.com).   
For a company to be eligible for payouts, it must prove that it successfully litigated a 
dumping or countervailing duty case against a specific industry in a specific country.  If 
eligible, a company shares, with the other original litigating companies, all past and 
future collected ADCV duties.  Companies that did not participate in an original dumping 
or countervailing duty case do not receive any of the collected funds (eBearing.com).   
 
The CDSOA went into effect for 2001 and was controversial from its inception.   
President Clinton signed the “Act” but asked Congress to revisit and repeal the CDSOA 
before adjournment; however, Congress did not act.  In industries that receive protection 
from imports under U.S. ADCV duty laws, ineligible companies for CDSOA payouts 
complain that eligible companies receive an unfair advantage derived from the subsidies 
(payouts).  Small companies complain that their industry is harmed by unfair imports but 
they do not have the money to hire expensive lawyers to litigate ADCV cases 
(eBearing.com).  The U.S. Treasury Department’s budget report states that the CDSOA 
allows “double dipping” because eligible companies not only receive protection from 
imports through increased import prices due to ADCV tariffs but now also receive 
corporate subsidies from the collected ADCV revenues (Thomas).  
 
U.S. trading partners have also reacted vigorously against the CDSOA.  Eleven member 
countries asked the WTO to form a panel to investigate the CDSOA with respect to the 
U.S. WTO obligations under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement.  The WTO formed a panel on September 10, 2001, and on 
September 16, 2002, that panel found against the U.S. on the CDSOA payments and 
recommended that the CDSOA be repealed (U.S. Department of State).  On October 18, 
2002, the U.S. appealed the ruling to the WTO Appellate Body, but on January 16, 2003, 
the Appellate Body confirmed that the CDSOA was incompatible with WTO rules   
(Lamy).     5
President Bush’s budget for fiscal year 2004 also calls for a repeal of the CDSOA. 
However, in spite of this and the WTO ruling, as of February 4, 2003, 67 U.S. senators 
had signed a letter to the President requesting that the President resist the WTO action 
and maintain the CDSOA.  With such strong support in the U.S. Senate for the CDSOA, 
it is still not clear that the law will be repealed. 
 
In fiscal year 2001, the first year of payouts, 900 claimants received $230 million dollars 
(Table 1).  In 2002, the second year, over 1200 claimants received almost $330 million 
(Table 1).  Although most of the payouts go to non-food companies, food companies 
received over $22 million in 2001 and almost $20 million in 2002 (Table 1).  In 2001, 
there were nine food-industry anti-dumping and four food-industry countervailing duty 
cases for which companies received tariff revenues under the CDSOA. In 2002, food-
industry anti-dumping cases in which companies received payouts increased to 12 while 
 
Table 1:  CDSOA FY 2001 and 2002 Disbursements for Food Products 
      





      
A-570-848  Crawfish tail meat/China  0 7,469
A-475-818 Pasta/Italy  17,533 4,674
C-475-819 Pasta/Italy  2,480 2,528
A-533-813 Preserved  mushrooms/India  171 2,155
A-351-605  Frozen concentrated orange juice/Brazil  0 1,175
A-570-831 Fresh  garlic/China  25 536
A-549-813 Canned  pineapple/Thailand  1,792 531
A-560-802 Preserved  mushrooms/Indonesia  83 443
A-337-803 Fresh  Atlantic salmon/Chile  0 173
A-403-801  Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway 46 59
C-403-802  Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway 18 29
A-570-851 Preserved  mushrooms/China  0 20
C-408-046 Sugar/EU  8 17
C-489-806 Pasta/Turkey  7 9
A-489-805 Pasta/Turkey  11 4
A-570-855  Non-frozen apple juice concentrate/China  0 1
A-301-602  Fresh cut flowers/Columbia  33 0
      
 Food  Total  22,209 19,824
  Grand Total for all Products  231,202 329,871
 
Source: U.S. Customs Service. 
 
food-industry countervailing duty cases remained at four.   
 
In some cases, the same company that received payouts under an anti-dumping case also 
received payouts under a countervailing duty case.  For example, eligible U.S. pasta firms 
shared $17.5 million and $4.7 million under the anti-dumping case A-475-818 in 2001 
and 2002, respectively, and shared $2.5 million under countervailing duty case C-475-  6
810 in both 2001 and 2002.   In the anti-dumping case A-540-843, canned 
pineapple/Thailand, one company, Maui Pineapple, received the entire revenue of $1.8 
million in 2001 and $0.5 million in 2001. 
 
In fiscal year 2002, crayfish firms receive in total the largest food-industry CDSOA 
payouts.  These firms and the CDSOA payouts that they received are reported in Table 2. 
Of the 27 eligible firms, Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors received payouts of $.8 
million.  Four received payouts of over $.5 million and another 17 firms received over $.1 
million.  On average, the 27 crayfish firms received $.3 million in fiscal year 2002.  In 
total, CDSOA payouts (column 3) were 21% of production and operating costs (column 
4) of these firms.  In fiscal year 2002, three citrus processors received $1.18 million in 
CDSOA payouts.  Citrus World received 67% of the payouts for a total of $.8 million 
(Table 3).   
DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL TARIFFS 
In order to derive and compare the optimal anti-dumping tariff, the optimal revenue tariff, 
and the optimal welfare tariff, we consider the following system of equations that 
represent the supply, demand, and excess demand curves for a particular product in the 
United States along with the excess supply curve for the foreign market (i.e., the rest of 
the world).  To make the solution tractable, we assume that each of these equations is 
linear and that the U.S. and foreign markets are competitive.  This system can be viewed 
















in which P is the price, QS is the quantity supplied by the U.S., I represents U.S. imports 
from the foreign market, and QD is the quantity demanded, which equals the quantity 
supplied (QS) plus imports (I).  If we introduce a specific tariff T, then T drives a wedge 
between the excess demand and excess supply curves.  In partial equilibrium, the 
following relationship must hold: 
T P P ES ED = − . (2) 
Inserting the relationships for PED and PES and solving for imports (I) yields: 
 
Table 2: CDSOA Disbursements for Crawfish Tail Meat from China, FY2002 
      
Claimant 







Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors 3,758 793 10.6
Seafood International Distributors 3,347 707 9.5
Catahoula Crawfish  2,937 620 8.3
Prairie Cajun Wholesale Seafood Dist.  2,449 517 6.9
Bayou Land Seafood  1,990 420 5.6  7
Crawfish Enterprises, Inc. (CPA)  1,892 399 5.3
C.J.'s Seafood & Purged Crawfish  1,773 374 5.0
Riceland Crawfish  1,517 320 4.3
Cajun Seafood Distributors  1,511 319 4.3
Acadiana Fishermen's Co-Op  1,508 318 4.3
Bonanza Crawfish Farm  1,482 313 4.2
Randol's Seafood & Restaurant (CPA)  1,445 305 4.1
L.T. West  1,126 238 3.2
Sylvester's Processors  1,036 219 2.9
Carl's Seafood  1,037 219 2.9
Choplin Seafood  999 211 2.8
Blanchard Seafood, Inc (CPA)  990 209 2.8
Louisiana Seafood  947 200 2.7
Harvey's Seafood  783 165 2.2
Louisiana Premium Seafoods  771 163 2.2
Bellard's Poultry & Crawfish  502 106 1.4
Phillips Seafood  450 95 1.3
A&S Crawfish  330 70 0.9
Becnel's Meat & Seafood  324 68 0.9
Teche Valley Seafood  225 48 0.6
Arnaudville Seaford  171 36 0.5
Lawtell Crawfish Processors  80 17 0.2
      
TOTAL for A-570-848  35,380 7,469 100
 
Source: U. S. Customs Service 




Table 3: CDSOA Disbursements for Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil, 
FY2002 
      
Claimant 







Citrus World  277,335 784 66.7
A. Duda & Sons dba Citrus Belle  75,817 214 18.2
LD Citrus, Inc   62,553 177 15.0
 
TOTAL for A-351-605  414,705 1,175 100
 









I . (3) 
The equilibrium U.S. price is derived by inserting equation (3) into the excess demand 











c P . (4) 
Finally, the U.S. quantity supplied in equilibrium can be derived by inserting equation (4) 
into the demand curve (1): 
()
) (




− + + − −
=
d
c T d d c
Q . (5) 
 
Equations (3-5) give the equilibrium quantity imported, the U.S. price, and the quantity 
supplied as functions of the specific tariff T and the parameters of the various supply and 
demand equations.  These relationships can be used to find the equilibrium tariff under 
various tariff regimes. 
 
As a base of reference, we first derive the optimal revenue tariff in terms of the 
parameters of the various supply and demand equations.  We then derive the optimal anti-
dumping tariff, rewrite it as a function of the underlying optimal revenue tariff, convert 
the parameters to point elasticities, and then compare the two.  Finally, we make 
inferences with respect to the optimal welfare tariff. 
 
First, consider the optimal revenue tariff.  The objective of the optimal revenue tariff is to 
maximize tariff revenue with respect to the tariff.  However, since tariff revenue is simply 
equal to the specific tariff (T) multiplied by equilibrium imports (I) this problem can be 
















TR MAXT  (6) 
which makes use of equation (3).  The optimal revenue tariff (TORT) is found by taking the 
derivative of equation (6) with respect to the specific tariff (T), setting it equal to zero, 

















After simplification, the optimal revenue tariff becomes: 
2
) ( γ −
=
c
TORT . (8) 
Hence, the optimal revenue tariff is always exactly one half of the distance between the 
intercept of the excess demand curve and the excess supply curve. 
 
Now, consider the optimal anti-dumping tariff defined as the tariff that maximizes the 
sum of producer surplus and tariff revenue.  The tariff revenue (TR) is the same as in 
equation (6).  Producer surplus for U.S. producers (as defined by Just, Hueth, and 
Schmitz, 1981) is equal to the area above the supply curve, bounded by the domestic 




α − = P Q PS S . (9)   9
However, the quantity supplied (QS) can be written in terms of P, α, and β using equation 








PS . (10) 
The optimal anti-dumping tariff is derived by making use of equation (4) to get the price 
in terms of the specific tariff (T), and maximizing the sum of producer surplus and tariff 
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. (13) 
Solution (13) holds only if β≠0 and d≠δ.  However, these conditions are not too 
restrictive.  The former holds as long as the supply curve is not perfectly elastic.  The 
latter relationship holds as long as the excess demand curve is downward sloping and the 
excess supply curve is upward sloping. 
 
In order to simplify this relationship further, the above parameters must be converted into 
their elasticity equivalents using the technique developed by Schmitz and Schmitz, 2003.  
Assuming that the point elasticities for each of the four curves are taken at the price, 
domestic quantity, and import levels that would exist under free trade, each of the 
parameters can be written in terms of elasticities and corresponding values that would 
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in which PW, QW, and IW are the equilibrium price, quantity, and imports, respectively, 
that would exist under free trade and εD, εS, εED, and εES are the elasticities of demand, 
supply, excess demand, and excess supply, respectively.  If we further substitute (14) into 
equation (13) and performing several rounds of simplifications, the optimal anti-dumping 
tariff can be expressed as:   10
()
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in which v is the ratio of the excess demand elasticity with respect to the excess supply 
elasticity, w is the ratio of the excess demand elasticity with respect to the domestic 
supply elasticity, and φ is the ratio of imports that would exist under free trade (IW) with 
respect to the domestic quantity that would exist under free trade (QW). 
 
In order to compare the optimal anti-dumping tariff in equation (15) with the optimal 
revenue tariff in equation (8), we substitute the relationships in (14) into equation (8) and 
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To obtain the optimal anti-dumping tariff in terms of the optimal revenue tariff, take 
relationship (16) and insert into (15) to get:  
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in which m represents the percentage markup of the optimal anti-dumping tariff over the 
optimal revenue tariff.  The top and the bottom of the markup rule m have a common 
right-hand term that contains v, w, and φ.  This common right-hand term is always 
negative because v and w are always negative as long as the domestic and excess supply 
curves are upward sloping and the domestic demand and excess demand curves are 
downward sloping.  Furthermore, φ is a share parameter that is always positive.   
 
After accounting for the common right hand term, the only remaining terms to compare 
are 2w in the numerator with the number one in the denominator.  The numerator is 
always negative because w is negative and the right-hand term is also negative.   
However, the denominator of m could be positive or negative depending upon whether 
2wφ(1-v) is less than -1 or greater than -1.  If 2wφ(1-v) < -1, then the optimal anti-
dumping “tariff” would mathematically be negative (in other words the optimal anti-
dumping “tariff” would actually be an export subsidy).  However, if we explicitly rule out 
the possibility of a negative tariff, then we must come to the conclusion that under the 
cases in which 2wφ(1-v) < -1, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is zero.  In other words, this 
case behaves essentially as a corner solution. 
 
The only viable case in which the tariff is positive occurs when the term 2wφ(1-v) > -1.  
Under these situations, both the numerator and the denominator of m are negative, 
meaning that the optimal anti-dumping tariff is positive.  Furthermore, the absolute value 
of the numerator is always larger than the absolute value of the denominator because 2w 
is always a negative number, while the number one is a positive number and the common 
right-hand term in the numerator and the denominator is negative.  Hence, we must come 
to the conclusion that under the cases in which 2wφ(1-v) > -1 (which generates a positive 
tariff), the markup rule m is always greater than one, which implies that the optimal anti-
dumping tariff (if it exists and is positive) is always larger than the optimal revenue tariff.   
   11
To summarize, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is either zero (representing a corner 
solution) or it is larger than the optimal revenue tariff (when it is positive).  This 
argument can be taken one step further in order to compare the optimal anti-dumping 
tariff discussed above (that maximizes the sum of tariff revenue and producer surplus) 
with the optimal welfare tariff (that maximizes the sum of tariff revenue, producer 
surplus, and consumer surplus).  It is well-known that the optimal welfare tariff is always 
smaller than the optimal revenue tariff (Schmitz and Schmitz, 1994).  Hence, through 
transitivity, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is either zero (representing a corner solution) 
or it is larger than the optimal welfare tariff (when it is positive). 
 
The above arguments are further illustrated in Figure 1 in which S and D in the left-hand 
panel represent the supply and demand curves and ES and ED in the right-hand panel 
represent the excess supply and excess demand curves.  First, consider the optimal anti-
dumping tariff.  The optimal anti-dumping tariff is the tariff that maximizes the sum of 
tariff revenue and producer surplus.  In the figure, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is 
represented by (p1-π1) where p1 is the domestic price under the optimal anti-dumping 
tariff and π1 is the resulting equilibrium world price under the optimal anti-dumping 
tariff.  Tariff revenue under the optimal anti-dumping tariff is given by area (hiknr) and 
producer surplus under the optimal anti-dumping tariff equals area (abc).  So total 
producer welfare equals (hiknr+abc). 
 
The optimal revenue tariff in figure 1 is (p2-π2) in which p2 is the domestic price under 
the optimal revenue tariff, and π2 is the resulting equilibrium world price.  While the 
tariff revenue under the optimal revenue tariff (area ijklnor) is always larger than the 
tariff revenue under the optimal anti-dumping tariff, producer surplus (ab) is always 
lower under the optimal revenue tariff. 
 
Now consider the optimal welfare tariff represented by (p3-π3) in which p3 is the domestic 
price, and π3 is the resulting equilibrium world price.  The tariff revenue under the 
 
Figure 1: Optimal Anti-Dumping, Revenue, and Welfare Tariffs  
 
optimal welfare tariff (area klm) could be larger or smaller than the tariff revenue under 
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optimal anti-dumping tariff.  However, the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, 
and tariff revenue under the optimal welfare tariff (area abcdefg + klm) is always larger 
than the sum of producer surplus and tariff revenue under the optimal anti-dumping tariff 
(area hiknr+abc). 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION 
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 allows manufacturers that 
successfully petition the U.S. to impose anti-dumping or countervailing tariffs on imports 
to keep the proceeds of those tariffs.  This paper analyzes the welfare implications of the 
so-called "Byrd" amendment by deriving an "optimal anti-dumping tariff" for U.S. 
producers that receive anti-dumping or countervailing tariffs and comparing it to the 
optimal revenue and optimal welfare tariffs.  We show that the optimal anti-dumping 
tariff is either zero or (when it is positive) is always larger than either the optimal revenue 
or the optimal welfare tariffs.   
 
We also compare tariff revenue and producer welfare under the optimal anti-dumping 
tariff, the optimal revenue tariff, and the optimal welfare tariff.  We show that tariff 
revenue is always largest under the optimal revenue tariff but show that producer surplus 
is always largest under the optimal anti-dumping tariff.  Tariff revenue under an optimal 
anti-dumping tariff may be larger or smaller than under the optimal welfare tariff.   
Although producer welfare is always lowest under an optimal welfare tariff, total surplus 
(consumer and producer surpluses plus tariff revenue) is always largest under an optimal 
welfare tariff.     13
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